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 Venezuela, April 2002: Coup or
 Popular Rebellion? The Myth of a
 United Venezuela
 BARRY CANNON
 School of Communications, Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland
 This article assesses the merits of opposing National Assembly reports
 into the coup against President Chavez of Venezuela in April 2002.
 Looking at the historical context and the content of the reports, it argues
 that the two opposing accounts reflect a class division that has always
 existed in Venezuela but has been officially denied. It concludes that a
 possible exit from the stalemate could be that the opposition accept the
 reality of this class division and therefore the Chavez government as a
 legitimate representative of the popular classes. This, however, is unli
 kely in the present circumstances.
 Keywords. Chavez, class polarisation, coup, National Assembly
 (reports into the coup), opposition, Venezuela.
 Introduction
 In April 2002, a series of events occurred in Venezuela, which to this day illustrate
 starkly the depth of division and polarisation in that country. During that month, the
 Workers Confederation of Venezuela [Confederaci?n de Trabajadores de Venezuela
 (CTV)] and the business federation Fedec?maras led a series of demonstrations and
 work stoppages aimed at overthrowing the elected government of President Hugo
 Ch?vez Fr?as. These actions were supported by almost the entire print, electronic and
 radio media, opposition political parties, a number of civil organisations and non
 governmental organisations (NGOs), sectors of the Armed Forces and much of the
 middle classes and the more established working classes represented by the CTV. On
 Thursday 11 April, the opposition held a multitudinous march to the headquarters of
 the state oil company Petr?leos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA) in the east of Caracas,
 which on arriving at that destination was directed by the leadership of the march,
 without warning or permission of the authorities, to the presidential palace in the
 centre of the capital. In the environs of the palace, up to twenty people were shot dead
 and many more were wounded, many of them amongst the marchers, but many also
 amongst pro-government demonstrators who had gathered around the palace to defend
 it. During the following 3 days, the government of Ch?vez Fr?as was toppled, a new
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 government led by the leader of Fedecamaras, Pedro Carmona Estanga, was installed
 only to be itself deposed, with Chavez returning early on Sunday 14 April.
 These events have since been interpreted by the government and its supporters
 as a "coup", while opposition sectors and supporters refer to them as a "popular
 insurrection". How is it that two such polarised visions of demonstrable events can
 emerge in one country? It could be argued that both accounts of the events of April
 2002 reflect not so much different views of the same demonstrable facts, but rather
 different visions of Venezuela as a nation. Both accounts reflect two opposing
 analyses of a continuously evolving process of polarisation between an economic
 ally enfranchised minority and the economically disenfranchised majority. Under
 lying these analyses is an ongoing struggle about the extent and nature of market
 led reforms between a heterogeneous Opposition, and a statist government as
 represented by Chavez.
 The struggle in Venezuela, however, has not emerged out of a vacuum, nor is it
 simply about the supremacy of one economic model over another; rather it is the
 contemporary expression of the multiple economic, social, cultural and racial
 fractures which have defined Venezuelan society since colonial times. In contem
 porary Venezuelan society, these fractures have become centred on a class-based
 political polarisation of society between the popular classes, composed of some
 sections of the unorganised working class, the unemployed and informal sectors,
 and the organised working, middle and upper classes, composed of salaried work
 ing and professional sectors and capitalist groups. This has led to a 'renewed
 political salience of social inequalities (...) bringing the axis of political competition
 into closer alignment with underlying structural cleavages' (Roberts, 2003:62-63).
 Chavez recognised and capitalised on this development, politically outstripping the
 other parties who were unable or unwilling to adapt to the new sociopolitical
 realities.
 This article attempts to answer the question posed in the title by first looking at the
 history of the country and the historical background to the emergence of Chavez. I
 argue in this section that Venezuela has consistently been riven by multiple divisions,
 which have been papered over by successive regimes, perpetuating a myth of a
 united, classless Venezuela. It will then look at the run-up to the coup, and the
 government and opposition versions of the events of April 2002, as set out in the
 parallel reports produced by both sides in the Asamblea Nacional (National Assem
 bly; AN), discussing the validity of each. Finally, in the conclusion, I argue that a key
 part of the opposition strategy is to deny the existence of class polarisation in
 Venezuelan society by attributing its existence solely to the discourse of the presi
 dent. The ideas and strategies used by many in the opposition, nevertheless, are
 equally as ideological and polarising as those of the government. The article con
 cludes that both sides need to accept the validity of the others' argument. Further
 more, I argue that the opposition in particular should construct policies which truly
 acknowledge the class divisions of Venezuela, thus recognising Chavez as a legitimate
 representative of the Venezuelan popular sectors and his government as the legit
 imate government of Venezuela. Nonetheless in the current polarised political climate
 in Venezuela, this is unlikely to happen.
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 Historical Context
 Venezuelan society has been polarised around conceptions of civilisation and barbar
 ism, knowledge and ignorance and rich and poor since its inception. The political
 response to this polarisation has been its denial through the imposition of authoritarian
 rule for most of its history,1 and from 1958 to 1998 by the imposition of a unique
 system of democratic rule described by Rey (1991) as a 'populist system of conciliation'.
 The essential struggle epitomised by the differing views of April 2002 is a continuation
 of the historically opposed visions of Venezuela dating back to colonial times, of cre?le
 (whites) on the one hand and pardo (mixed race) and slave (black) on the other,
 identified by Carrera Damas (1980). While the Creoles sought to liberate themselves
 from Spain to perpetuate and deepen the colonial occupation and exploitation of
 Venezuela, the pardos and slaves sought their own personal physical, social and
 economic liberation. Venezuela's independence was thus born under the sign of a
 double ideology, that of the liberal conception of the state, in Carrera Damas' words
 'the ideological trap of the dominant class' (ibid 86-87) and of social liberation for the
 dominated sectors. Bolivar was the living embodiment of this dichotomy being at once
 a member of the dominant classes and Venezuela's greatest ideologue of liberal con
 cepts of liberty and equality. Nonetheless, the liberal conception of the state was the
 triumphant ideology which emerged from the struggles which wreaked havoc in
 Venezuela during the first half of the nineteenth century, establishing its hegemony to
 the point where 'it was not possible to conceive of the State or society under any other
 form of organisation' (ibid 1980: 108).
 Concepts of liberty and equality, however, became an essential part of the fabrica
 tion of legality through its codification in successive constitutions. The republic was
 thus formed under a dichotic conception, that of social justice and equality, which was
 more legal aspiration than social fact, and of Creole domination of the economic, social
 and political life of the country (ibid 1980: 96). In effect, the structural inequalities and
 colonial objectives inherited from the Spanish remained intact; that is, the use of free or
 cheap labour for the purposes of occupying and exploiting the territory for the financial
 and social gain of the elite. Thus a 'total disassociation between legal codes, govern
 ment practice, class segregation and collective conscience developed [which] has per
 sisted up until this day' (Carvallo, 1994:146).
 For the most part, this hegemony was exercised politically through autocracy aimed at
 the continued implantation of the capitalist system and the perpetuation of the elites as
 the dominant classes and natural rulers of Venezuela. Initially, this autocracy was effected
 through internal class struggles led by caudillos, or military strongmen, for domination of
 the fledgling Venezuelan State. However, autocracy was later perfected in the dictatorship
 of Antonio Guzman Blanco (1870-1888), in what Carrera Damas refers to as a 'civilis
 ing' autocracy, that is an autocracy which further developed the 'tyranny' of the ruling
 classes through an intense programme of modernisation (Carvallo, 1999:109).
 1 'The country had experienced only 8 months of civilian-elected government during its
 first century and a quarter of independence (1830-1958)' (Myers, 1996:229).
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 Coronil and Skurski (1991) identify the concept of history in Venezuelan national
 discourse as one of 'the uncertain advance of civilisation over barbarism'. Guzman
 Blanco and Juan Vincente Gom?z (1908-1935) were the political expressions of this
 concept, self-styled heirs of Bolivar as they embodied like him 'the union between
 civilising force and barbarous energy that must be reproduced in the struggle to achieve
 historical progress' (Coronil and Skurski, 1991:297). These rulers, 'democratic Caesars'
 to paraphrase Vallenilla Lanz (1999), became 'civilisers' of the barbaric masses through
 modernising policies that built the foundations of the Venezuelan state, its bureaucracies,
 transportation networks, and most importantly under Gom?z its oil industry, while
 always formally observing the official liberal ideology of the Venezuelan elite. This
 bourgeois elite, with its access particularly to the United States and Europe, was the
 font of received wisdom, importing ideologies and implanting 'modernisation' on the
 'barbarous' body of the Venezuelan nation. Meanwhile a 'racial dualism' developed,
 where on the one hand a process of miscegenation was taking place, and on the other
 hand blacks, and to a lesser extent pardos, were subject to social and economic exploit
 ation (Wright, 1990:14). As modernisation processes developed, concepts of civilisation,
 race and social and economic domination became intertwined with class divisions.
 The Triumph and Consolidation of Liberal Democracy 1945-1989
 The transformation of Venezuela into an oil state during the Gom?z regime brought
 with it a decline of agriculture and an increasing migration to the cities, which in turn
 stimulated the growth of an urban bourgeoisie who developed new conceptions of the
 liberal state, more in tune with the times and demands of a rapidly modernising oil
 state. The 'generation of 28'2 developed a liberal democratic approach to governing
 that revolved around the twin principles of political liberty and economic entitlement,
 the former based on universal suffrage and the latter on the control of Venezuela's oil
 wealth and its exploitation on behalf of the 'totality of the Venezuelan people' (Suarez
 Figueroa quoted in Coronil, 1997:96).
 The installation of liberal democracy, first in 1945 and again, definitively, in 1958,
 was in itself an illustration of the civil-military dichotomy of Venezuelan society. Most
 governments in Venezuela up until then had been led by military personnel or installed
 by the military. The installation of democratic regimes under Acci?n Democr?tica was
 no exception, as both were effected by means of a coup. Venezuelan democracy, there
 fore, was definitively installed through non-democratic means.
 Rey (1991) described the Venezuelan democratic system as 'a populist system of
 conciliation' based on a number of explicit and implicit pacts. The foundation of the
 system was the Punto Fijo pact3 where each party promised to abide by the electoral
 2 Name of a group of students and activists of the Central University of Venezuela (UCV)
 who rebelled against the Gomez dictatorship. Romulo Betancourt, Raul Leoni, Pio
 Tamayo and Jovita Villalba were among them.
 3 Named after Rafael Caldera's (leader and founder member of Copei, the Christian
 Democratic party) house in Caracas where the pact was formulated and signed by
 Caldera, Betancourt (AD) and Villalba (URD) on 31 October 1958.
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 rules and relinquish power when required by electoral outcomes of the popular vote.
 Significantly, the left was excluded from participating, despite the important role
 played by the Partido Comunista Venezolano [Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV)]
 in the struggle against the Perez Jimenez dictatorship. Indeed, Betancourt actively
 pursued the exclusion of the left from Venezuelan politics by both peaceful and violent
 means (Ewell, 1984:131). Not until 1973 did the left begin to appear once again in
 Venezuelan parliamentary politics, and an 'undercurrent of political resentment (...)
 ran just below the surface of Venezuelan politics' throughout the Punto Fijo era due
 to AD's hegemonic exclusionary policies against the left, which would 'resurface with
 the crisis of legitimacy after 1989' (Hellinger, 2003:28-29).
 The Punto Fijo regime was set up to reconcile the complex dichotomous tendencies
 in Venezuelan society and politics: between elite domination and popular demands for
 equality, the military and civilians, 'barbarism' and 'civilisation', the private and public
 economies, dominated and dominating classes, etc. It developed as a 'complex system
 of negotiation and accommodation of heterogeneous interests in which mechanisms of
 a utilitarian type played a central role in the generation of support for the regime and
 furthermore, its maintenance in power' (Rey, 1991:543). The system was a delicate
 balancing act between the interests of powerful minority sectors and maintaining the
 confidence of the majority in the system, as the best means to achieve 'liberty, justice
 and wellbeing' (Rey, 1991:543).
 The Punto Fijo regime was designed to avoid conflict and antagonism, encourage
 conciliation and negate the polarisation of Venezuelan society along class lines
 (Carvallo and L?pez Maya, 1989:48). Initially, AD was oriented towards and sup
 ported by lower class constituencies and Copei to better-off communities. As time went
 by, however, this class cleavage eroded as the party system developed and became
 institutionalised, and the parties became 'archetypal multiclass, catchall electoral orga
 nisations' (Roberts, 2003:58-59). As the system consolidated, the economic model
 began to be exhausted under the weight of a slump in oil prices and increased external
 borrowing, and 'a false image of consensus was created', leading to a mistrust and
 subsequent exclusion of dissent (Civit and Espa?a, 1989:39). From Black Friday in
 February 1983, when the government of Luis Herrera Campins dramatically devalued
 the bolivar in the face of a slump in oil prices and massive capital flight, the Punto Fijo
 regime began to lose support (Lander, 1996:50).
 'Puntofijismo' had a number of important achievements, principally political sta
 bility, confidence of the population in the democratic regime and its leadership and
 relative economic growth, not to mention improved educational, health and general
 living standards for the majority of Venezuelans (Kornblith, 1989:145). Nonetheless,
 the fundamental flaw in the Punto Fijo design was the contradiction between the liberal
 democratic order on the juridical constitutional level and the reformist character of the
 social and economic order (Carrera Damas, 1980:187). Once the pillar of a limitless oil
 income fell, and the addiction to indebtedness took hold, the contradiction between
 these two parts became manifest and the model became unsustainable. Both parts of
 the Punto Fijo equation became irreconcilable, and with it the fragile system of
 consensus became divided once again along class lines. Increasingly, the notion gained
 currency amongst some elite sectors that it was no longer possible to give to one sector
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 without taking from the other. The question was which sector was going to pay. In the
 context of the increased global hegemony of the market, the Venezuelan economic elite
 began to press more urgently for reforms that made the popular classes pay.
 Meanwhile, the formal defenders of the popular classes, such as the CTV, actively
 collaborated or stood on the sidelines leaving the majority of the population without
 effective representation (Civit and Espa?a, 1989:39). It was no longer possible to
 conceal the multiple social fractures in the political order of Venezuela.
 This became most apparent during the Caracazo (27-28 February 1989), a huge
 popular explosion of discontent against radical market-oriented reforms introduced by
 President Carlos Andr?s Per?z (1989-1993). Residents of Caracas' teeming shantytowns,
 and those of other major cities, came down from the cerros (hills) and proceeded to loot
 shops and warehouses, initially for food, but as the disturbances developed, for all
 sorts of consumer goods. Government reaction was initially tame but eventually
 President P?rez called a state of emergency and left it to the Army and police to
 quell the disturbances. The result was the use of 'massive violence', an official death
 toll of 277, and an unofficial one running into the thousands (Coronil and Skurski,
 1991:326).
 The establishment reading of the Caracazo was the eruption of barbarism, of primi
 tivism pitted against civilisation (Coronil and Skurski, 1991:327). The pueblo (people)
 was a source of barbarism, the government and the elite a force for reason and civilisa
 tion: '[t]he nation was split in two' (Coronil and Skurski, 1991:328). The Caracazo
 symbolised the eruption of the class factor once again into national politics (Carvallo and
 L?pez Maya, 1989:48).4 Even the president acknowledged this in a speech to the nation
 on 28 February, a notion violently rejected by Fedec?maras (Carvallo and L?pez Maya,
 1989:50-51). The CTV, due to its position both within the power structure and as
 representatives of working people, also avoided acknowledging the inescapable class
 nature of the Caracazo and the measures which sparked it off (Carvallo and L?pez
 Maya, 1989:51). Despite the President's recognition of the class nature of the distur
 bances and his reforms, he persisted in implementing them, leading initially to some
 macroeconomic success but by 1992 unemployment, informalisation of employment and
 poverty had all increased (Lander, 1996). In 1989 alone, poverty increased from 46 to 62
 per cent of the population, while those living in extreme poverty more than doubled,
 from 14 to 30 per cent of the population (Roberts, 2003:59).
 The Comisi?n Presidencial para la Reforma del Estado (Presidential Commission for
 the Reform of the State; COPRE)5 led to the emergence or consolidation of movements
 representing the popular sectors, such as the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement to
 Socialism, MAS), La Causa Radical (Radical Cause; LCR) and Chavez's Movimiento
 Bolivariano Revolucionario-200 (Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement-200; MBR-200)
 4 After the Caracazo, Venezuela would not be the same again as protest became the
 norm, increasing in incidence, violence and variety and extending to almost all sectors
 of society (L?pez Maya, 2002).
 5 Process begun in 1984 attempting to reform the state and make it more responsive
 democratically. One of its most far-reaching measures was decentralisation at state and
 municipal level, allowing new parties and movements to have power bases.
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 amongst others.6 These movements began to organise around alternative trades unions
 organisations (LCR) or in the army (MBR-200), and some began to achieve representa
 tion in governorships and in Congress. LCR and MAS, however, accepted the system's
 rules whilst seeking to reform them, while the MBR-200 sought to replace the system
 entirely. Meanwhile, the multi-class systemic parties AD and Copei faced a precipitous
 decline in the face of this heightened class conflict. They found themselves unable either
 to comprehensively represent the increasingly divergent interests of the different classes,
 or to definitively transform themselves into class-based parties representing one or other
 side of the social divide. Rafael Caldera, sensing this, abandoned the party he founded,
 Copei, and won the elections in 1993 through an alliance with MAS, other smaller
 parties and his own electoral vehicle Convergencia (Common Direction). Yet, such
 reforms could not re-establish people's faith in Venezuelan democratic institutions. In
 1982, for example, almost 60 per cent of the population had a positive image of political
 parties, but by 1992 around 60 per cent had a negative image (Njaim, Combellas and
 Alvarez, 1998:17) Furthermore, almost 40 per cent of those surveyed had a negative
 opinion on the constitutional system as it existed, especially marked amongst lower class
 sectors (Njaim, Combellas and Alvarez, 1998:99-100). Causes for the crisis were blamed
 on corruption, the parties, the economic situation and the lack of participation in the
 political process (Njaim, Combellas and Alvarez, 1998:106). The system had lost its
 legitimacy with the electorate and the Punto Fijo attempt at modernisation finally
 resulted in mass alienation rather than the mass loyalty so nearly gained through the
 policy of 'sowing the oil'.
 Puntofijismo ultimately had done little to tackle income inequalities, and as the
 crisis set in so popular class income levels worsened. As Roberts (2003:60) points out
 'during a period of generalised macroeconomic decline, income became more highly
 concentrated, and society became more sharply divided between elite and popular
 sectors'. Venezuelans saw their standard of living plummet: between 1990 and 1997
 per capita income fell from $5192 to $2858 and the country's human development
 index fell from 0.8210 to 0.7046 (OCEI/PNUD, 2001:92). The Venezuelan middle and
 upper classes shrunk beyond recognition from over 40 per cent of the population in
 1989 to around 10 per cent by 1999 (Hellinger, 2003:38). Open unemployment grew
 from 6.6 per cent in 1980 to 15.4 per cent in 1999, much of that decline in the
 agricultural and industrial sectors in favour of the service sector (Roberts, 2003:60).
 Informalisation of employment grew from 34.5 per cent in 1980 to 53 per cent in 1999
 (Roberts, 2003:60). In 1978, 10 per cent of the population lived in general poverty
 and just 2 per cent in extreme poverty, but by 1990 these figures had risen to 40
 and 14.6 per cent, respectively and by 1999, 49.4 and 21.7 per cent (Buxton 2003:115;
 ECLAC, 2002:212).
 In such a devastating economic scenario, as the popular classes became the majority,
 so estrangement from the system became more marked amongst those groups. Dis
 approval of the constitutional system was highest amongst the informal groups and the
 unemployed and approval highest amongst businessmen and industrialists (Njaim,
 6 See Ellner (1986) on MAS; Lopez Maya (1996) on La Causa R and MBR-200.
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 Combellas and Alverez, 1998:99-100). By 1998, most voters identified themselves as
 independents and eschewed party identification (Datanalisis, 1998:28). Voting patterns
 showed increasing abstentionism from a low of 3.5 per cent in 1973 to a high of 39.8
 per cent in 1993, a tendency which has remained ever since (McCoy and Smith,
 1995:137)7 Venezuelan society became increasingly polarised along social and
 economic lines, leading to a stronger class-consciousness amongst popular and middle
 sectors, which was reflected in estrangement from the system.
 The government of President Rafael Caldera (1993-1998) tried to implement
 piecemeal neoliberal reform under the Agenda Venezuela programme, but Venezuela's
 crisis continued to deepen and widen, and in the increased breach between the political
 establishment and all sectors of society a search for political alternatives and new
 political and economic models was under way. In 1997, the MBR-200 became a new
 electoral movement, the Movimiento Quinta Rep?blica (Fifth Republic Movement,
 MVR) and began to prepare for the 1998 elections.8 The MVR quickly became an
 electoral grouping for the original military core of the movement, the once-excluded
 vanguardist left, and many members of the established parties disenchanted with their
 policies. It forged alliances with a number of parties on the left, such as Patria Para
 Todos (Motherland for Everyone, PPT) a more radical excision of LCR; MAS, which
 had been in alliance with Caldera's Convergencia movement; and smaller parties such
 as the PCV amongst others, to create the Polo Patri?tico (Patriotic Pole; PP). Ch?vez
 won the presidential elections with 56% of the votes, the PP winning 33% of the seats
 in both houses of Congress (Lingenthal, 1999:222-223). While the Ch?vez vote had
 strong penetration at all levels, polls suggested that his appeal was particularly strong
 amongst the popular classes, whereas his chief rival Henrique Salas R?mer's appeal
 was amongst the middle and upper sectors (Roberts, 2003:66). A similar social class
 division was repeated in the 2000 elections: 50.5 per cent of socioeconomic sector E
 voted for Ch?vez as opposed to 24 per cent for Arias Cazdenas, ex Coup companion of
 Ch?vez, while 66.7 per cent of socioeconomic groups A/B voted for the latter (El
 Universal, 6 April 2000). Despite a consistent opposition campaign against the
 President, the concentration of supporters amongst the lowest social levels, according
 to polls, remains strong. In July 2001, the President retained strongest support amongst
 social sector E, while rejection was strongest amongst A, B and C groups (Datanalisis,
 2001:21). More recently, despite a fall of support amongst the popular sectors, an
 opposition poll still showed strongest support for the President amongst sectors D (31
 per cent) and E (35 per cent) as opposed to only 16 and 27 per cent support for the
 President amongst social sectors ABC+ and C, respectively (Primero Justicia, 2003:8).
 One poll suggests that in a fresh election 33.6 per cent would vote in favour of Ch?vez
 staying in power, and in an open presidential election with various candidates, 29.4 per
 7 Polls before the 1998 and 2000 elections showed that the poorest parts of the
 population were the least likely to vote (Hellinger, 2003:44).
 8 It was illegal to use the name of the Liberator, Bolivar, for political parties in
 Venezuela. By using V, the roman numeral for five, the movement's name remained
 unchanged verbally due to the similarity in Spanish pronunciation of the b and v
 consonants.
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 cent would vote for the President (El Universal, 20 June 2003). Coppedge (2002:4-5)
 therefore is correct when he points out that: 'The size of Chavez's base of electoral
 support [..] remains solid in comparative perspective [with previous Venezuelan pre
 sidents and other Latin American leaders]'. Furthermore, Chavez's rise 'signified a
 repoliticisation of social inequality in Venezuela' with mostly the popular sectors
 identifying with Chavez and the middle and upper sectors with opponents of the
 president (Roberts, 2003:55).
 Chavez and the MVR therefore recognise and capitalise on the fundamental class
 polarisation of Venezuelan society, as Chavez's repeated references to the Venezuelan
 elites as 'oligarchs' signify. Furthermore, it is Chavez's very rejection of neoliberalism
 which provides much of his popular appeal. Salas R?mer promised a short sharp shock
 therapy, which was rejected by the electorate (Buxton, 2003:124). As Ellner (2003:16)
 points out 'the presidential elections of 1988, 1993, 1998 and 2000 represented
 popular mandates to avoid the neoliberal approach, which both Presidents Perez and
 Caldera ignored'. Furthermore, rejection of this approach, poll data would suggest, is
 strongest amongst the popular classes. This signifies that any candidate who promotes
 the implantation of a market-dominated economic model 'is practically assured
 [electoral] defeat' (Datanalisis, 1998:16).
 April 2002: Coup or Popular Rebellion?
 Context
 Despite this politicisation of social inequality and the concentration of support of the
 middle and upper classes in favour of opposition candidates, ideological homogeneity
 amongst the opposition to the President is not apparent. The parties supporting Salas in
 1998, for example, were to the right of the ideological spectrum, while those support
 ing Arias in 2000 were to the left.9 Nevertheless, both candidates received support from
 the upper socioeconomic brackets. Furthermore, few of Chavez's policies while in
 office seriously prejudiced middle- and upper-class privilege, nor to date have they
 seriously affected poverty. This suggests that opposition to Chavez, and support for
 him, is based not just on ideological or material actions, but also on other more
 profound psychological, moral and class-based fears and prejudices.
 Objectively speaking, the opposition had a number of grounds to seriously question
 the legitimacy of the Chavez government. First, the Constitution of 1999 strengthened
 the power of the Executive by extending the presidential term from 5 to 6 years,
 providing the possibility of re-election for one more period, and strengthening the
 power of the president over the Armed Forces. There was increased centralisation
 with less autonomy for regional and municipal powers, PDVSA and the Central Bank.
 Furthermore, as the president's term advanced, he developed signs of authoritarianism
 9 Salas was supported by his own Pro Venezuela movement, AD and Copei amongst
 others. Arias was supported by, for example, LCR and Bandera Roja, a far left party
 which once supported the armed struggle.
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 and disrespect for the adversary. There was evidence of some disregard for the
 Constitution in the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court (TSJ) and to the
 National Electoral Council as well as the appointment of the State Prosecutor and
 the Ombudsman (PROVEA, 2002:17). Appointment to public office was based on
 their political attachments of the incumbents rather than popular participation in their
 selection as required by the Constitution (ibid:27). There were threats to freedom of
 expression in the media, including violent threats from supposedly armed, government
 created Bolivarian Circles (ibid: 18), a lack of inclusion of concerned groups in policy
 formulation as stipulated in the Constitution and inconsistencies between electoral
 promises and government action (ibid:20?21). The President's belligerent, exclusive
 discourse and increased militarisation of the government were also points of concern
 (ibid:23).
 Second, the government's claim to electoral legitimacy was particularly weakened in
 such a context, considering the high levels of abstentionism in elections and referenda.
 Almost 50 per cent abstained in the elections of 1998; 62 per cent in the referendum for
 the Constituent Assembly (April 1999); 54 per cent in Constituent Assembly elections
 (July 1999); 56 per cent in the referendum approving the new Constitution (December,
 1999) (Buxton, 2000:29); 43 per cent in the 2000 Presidential elections (Fleischer,
 2000); 76.50 per cent in Trade Union leadership referendum, December 2000 (Consejo
 Nacional Electoral (CNE), 2003). Buxton (2000) can therefore point out with accuracy
 that the Ch?vez government's radical institutional reform was carried out without the
 expressed support of a majority of Venezuelans.
 Finally, Parker (2002) lists a number of factors which caused the opposition to
 harden its positions and bring with it middle- and upper-class support. The govern
 ment's attempt to make the CTV more representative of the broader categories of
 workers through the referendum of December 2000, the election of Carlos Ortega to
 the presidency of that organisation, and the continuing difficulties between government
 and CTV, brought that organism firmly into the opposition camp. A hurriedly intro
 duced set of 49 Enabling Laws, affecting interests such as landowners, and the oil
 industry, long a middle- and upper-class preserve, led Fedec?maras, already unfavour
 ably disposed to the government, to take an even more robust stance against it.
 Perceived attacks on the Church's preserve of private education, continued attempts
 to take more control of the oil industry, the so-called 'drip' of military personnel in
 open rebellion against the government, and consistent attacks on the media led to the
 eventual eclipsing of the political parties in the opposition leadership and their replace
 ment by these social sectors, with Fedec?maras, the CTV and the media in the lead.
 In sum, government actions increased an already high level of rejection amongst the
 bulk of the middle and upper classes. Various fronts of indiscriminate conflict ensued,
 which 'without doubt helped to unify the opposition, not around an alternative project,
 but rather behind the slogan "out with Ch?vez"' (Gonz?lez Plessmann, 2002:14). As
 Ch?vez consolidated his power and conflict intensified with pro-system actors in
 contradiction to Venezuela's traditional consensus politics, the hegemonic struggle
 became discursively centred on 'democracy' and not class. Ch?vez narrowed his
 focus to encompass all those who sought consensual reformist politics, whatever
 their ideological background. In so doing, the differing opposition fragments found a
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 centralising ideological discursive element which could successfully obscure the funda
 mental class divisions of Venezuelan society as reflected in their own divisiveness and
 uncertain ideological consensus.
 Government and Opposition Accounts of the Coup
 The prelude to the April 2002 coup was a series of highly publicised work stoppages
 and marches, which once again showed polarisation along class lines. Most opposition
 marches were held in the wealthier sectors in the east of Caracas, while marches in
 support of the President were held in the poorer western sectors, and during opposition
 stoppages informal workers continued to work (Hellinger, 2003:49). The coup itself
 took place during an opposition march, which began in the wealthier east of the city,
 and it was the poor from the peripheral barrios who returned Chavez to power.
 Shortly after the April events of 2002, Venezuela's National Assembly instigated a
 parliamentary investigation into the events, which eventually produced two irreconcil
 able accounts further reflecting the political aspect of this polarisation. On the one
 hand, the opposition account described the events as a 'constitutional rebellion' against
 the government of President Chavez, but on the other hand, the government and its
 supporters clearly labelled it a golpe de estado. It proved impossible to reach a
 compromise, resulting in the publication of two separate reports reflecting the
 polarised nature of Venezuelan society and politics.
 The accounts differed on most of the fundamental events of the coup. The opposi
 tion report maintained that only Chavez was to blame for the situation, as he had
 created a context of ungovernability due to his repeated infringements of the Constitu
 tion. This had prompted a huge march on 11 April which was peaceful, unarmed, and
 hence was not insurrectional, as the government maintained, as it did 'not have the
 characteristics to define it as such' (Tablante, 2002). Nonetheless, the President had
 permitted and/or ordered the Bolivarian Circles, Armed Forces and the National Guard
 to open fire on the demonstrators, and hence he was the only person responsible for
 their deaths. This left the Armed Forces no choice but to defend the Venezuelan people
 by seeking the president's resignation in support of the civic insurrection. According to
 Army Chief Vazquez Velasco, it was not a coup, nor insubordination 'but a position of
 solidarity with all the Venezuelan people'.
 The government account (Asamblea Nacional, 2002), however, stated that it was
 the opposition who deliberately created this situation of ungovernability and chaos as
 part of a plan to facilitate the coup, and as such was responsible for the deaths which
 occurred on 11 April. The march became insurrectional when it changed its route to
 the Presidential Palace of Miraflores with the express purpose of violently removing the
 President from office. The events could only be termed a coup as they were planned
 conspiratorially with sectors of the military, business, opposition and media involved.
 Its execution had military hallmarks, including the leading of the march to the Palace,
 road blocks set up on some of the main highways and finally snipers, from the
 Metropolitan and other opposition police forces, stationed at key points near the
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 Palace. These snipers opened fire on government supporters, causing the latter to
 defend themselves, and on opposition demonstrators too.
 According to the opposition account, as chaos reigned outside the Palace and its
 environs, the Armed Forces 'rebelled' under Article 350 of the Constitution,10 and as
 Ch?vez appeared to have resigned, a 'constitutional power vacuum' was therefore
 created. The Armed Forces turned to Pedro Carmona Estanga to fulfil the presidential
 role in the interim. Once Carmona became the President, however, he proceeded to
 break with the constitutional order by abolishing all the Constitutional powers and
 appointing a new government in a ten-point decree read out in Miraflores (Carmona,
 2002). With this act, Carmona alienated many of the principal political parties, the
 CTV, sectors of civil society and the Army and as a result eventually had to stand
 down, paving the way for the return of Ch?vez to the presidency.
 The government account, however, strongly rejects the notion of a 'constitutional
 power vacuum'. Ch?vez could not have resigned because he was kidnapped and was
 being held incommunicado. In such circumstances, his resignation would have been by
 definition against his will, the National Assembly would have had to ratify it, and the
 Vice-President should have become President. None of this took place and hence, the
 government report argues, the 'power vacuum' was unconstitutional and the Carmona
 government de facto. Furthermore, the Carmona government had no basis in popular
 support, with no political programme to speak of and no real plan to assure power.
 The result was chaos and the deaths, arrest and torture of many civilians and govern
 ment officers and supporters in the ensuing few days.
 Which of these accounts is the most accurate? Rey (2002:14) agrees with the
 opposition insofar as recognising that the President's authoritarian tendencies and the
 resulting polarisation increased the former's desperation. Legal options to a change of
 government, in the short term, seemed unworkable, thus increasing the likelihood of a
 coup being used to effect its removal. He has no doubt, however, that the events
 constituted a coup and not a 'constitutional rebellion' as the opposition claim. First,
 he states that it was impossible for Ch?vez to resign 'voluntarily' in such a situation
 because there were clear pressures from the military for him to do so, and thus it could
 not have been of his own free will and as such was unconstitutional (Rey, 2002:6).
 Second, the theory of the 'constitutional power vacuum' is a fallacy behind which the
 perpetrators of the coup wished to obscure the army's role in the deposing of the
 President. It was clear that it was the Armed Forces and not Carmona who was in
 charge. There was rather, according to Rey, an 'unconstitutional power vacuum'
 because the President had been illegally imprisoned, and the Vice-President was in
 hiding to avoid the same fate, yet there was no military leader prepared to assume
 power (Rey, 2002:10). Those who signed the decree had no claim to representation of
 the people, the majority being unelected members of interest groups. Carmona claimed
 that he had a popular mandate, as a result of the march on 11 April, but the march was
 10 Article 350: 'The Venezuelan People, faithful to their republican tradition, and the
 struggle for their independence, peace, liberty, will withdraw recognition from any
 regime, legislation, or authority which contradicts the valued, principles, and
 democratic guarantees or violates human rights' (Tablante, 2002:41).
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 against Ch?vez and not acclaiming him as the new President (Rey, 2002:12). The coup
 failed because there was no clear leadership or ideological proposal behind it (Rey,
 2002:13). Yet, those who participated in the coup could not recognise it as such, first
 because of the negative connotations such an act has within Venezuela, second, because
 it would have been illegal and finally because any government owing its existence to a
 coup would have failed to win support under the Interamerican Democratic Charter
 (Rey, 2002:12-13). Rey's analysis would thus agree substantially with the government
 deputies' analysis outlined above.
 Furthermore, there are clear inconsistencies in the opposition discourse and their
 own behaviour before, during and after the coup, which are omitted from the opposi
 tion account. Opposition criticisms of the government's aggressive behaviour towards
 them do not take account of the persistent, equally aggressive and almost universal
 media campaign against the government at both home and abroad (Various authors,
 2002; Werz, 2001). Their complaints about Chavez's attacks on the media and the
 effects this had on freedom of expression were compromised by their almost total
 disregard for transmitting the facts during the coup. Indeed, according to one analyst,
 'there was an information blackout planned in solidarity or connivance with the de
 facto government [of Carmona]' (Gonz?lez Plessmann, 2002: 20).
 The complaints about the government arming groups of supporters do not take
 account of violent attacks on targets connected to the government, the possibility of
 opposition agents provacateurs causing violence or the use of smear tactics by the
 media.11 Furthermore, the general climate of violence and the gun culture found
 throughout Venezuela makes it highly likely that both sides will have armed groups
 within their ranks, especially in such a polarised situation.
 One of the principal criticisms of Ch?vez by the opposition, as I have already
 signalled, is the lack of independent institutions and the rule of law. Yet, during the
 brief government of Carmona, all institutions were abolished leaving the country
 effectively without the rule of law. Many of those from 'civil society', who
 had previously criticised Ch?vez on this issue, were present at the ceremony where
 Carmona announced his decrees and published an advertisement in support of the
 Carmona government in national newspapers in the following days (Gonz?lez Plessmann,
 2002:20). Their commitment to democracy was thus revealed to be circumstantial
 and not ideological. The willingness of sectors of the opposition to actively conspire
 to achieve the downfall of a democratically elected government, and to support a
 clearly authoritarian project in the name of 'democracy', indicates that it is not 'an
 authentic preoccupation for the strengthening of democracy [which motivates them,
 but that] they find in the Ch?vez project a threat or obstacle to their propositions'
 (Gonz?lez Plessmann, 2002:21).
 11 For violent attacks on governing party see, for example, El Nacional 28 February
 2002: D/10 for possibility of opposition violence see story on arms cache in home of
 P?rez Recao see El Nacional 16 April 2002: D/8, identified by Patricia Poleo as a chief
 co-conspirator (Poleo, 2002); for media smear campaigns see Villegas (2002) on
 Patricia Poleo's fabrication of videos.
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 Clearly then, neither the opposition nor the government can claim entirely accurate
 accounts. Both sides have elements in their favour: there is evidence of authoritarianism
 to be found in the Chavez government as the opposition claims, yet there is also
 evidence to support the governments interpretation of the April events as being a
 clear case of a coup. Both sides claim to represent democracy, yet both sides have
 proven themselves to use authoritarianism when it suits them. Rather than being
 judged for their veracity or lack of it the two accounts represent two visions of
 Venezuela, as they are indicative of the polarised division of the country into two
 blocs, a polarisation as we have seen which has deep roots in Venezuelan history, but
 has long been denied by successive Venezuelan governments, both authoritarian and
 democratic.
 Conclusion: The Fiction of a United Venezuela
 Curiously enough, both documents also reveal some consistencies, in attitudes if not in
 facts. Deeply engrained in both accounts is a mutual rejection of the legitimacy of the
 other. The government report, for example, states: 'An elemental error of those
 involved in the coup was to try to identify themselves as 'civil society' when in effect
 they were part of the caraque?o society and the middle class' (Asamblea Nacional
 2002:24). However, Tablante (2002) insists that Chavez through his actions was
 responsible for dividing society into 'two sectors', placing the administration at the
 service of one particular political tendency (Tablante, 2002; Conclusion no.4). Further
 more as seen above, General Vazquez Velasco claimed that the Army acted in the name
 of 'all Venezuelans'. Both groups disqualify the support of the other sector; for the
 government, the opposition are 'squalid', few in number and privileged; for the
 opposition, government supporters are 'chavistas' and 'hordes'. As such, each sector
 is minoritised and dehumanised; the middle and upper classes overweening oligarchs,
 the popular classes primitive hordes, harking back to conceptions of civilisation and
 barbarism. In that vein also Chavez is seen as primitive (Nairn, 2001:67), uncouth,
 unpolished, in effect uncivilised, poor, mixed race, without finesse, 'sin preparaci?n'.
 Finally, both accounts justified their actions as legal and disqualified the adversary's
 actions as illegal. And both accounts accused the other of the use of the military to
 surreptitiously plan violent actions against the people.
 There is thus a mutual claim to universality and a negation of the legitimacy of the
 support of the adversary. Nonetheless, only the government account accepts the class
 nature of the support behind both groups by identifying it as 'caraque?o' and 'middle
 class' and their supporters as 'el pueblo'. The opposition, by attributing polarisation to the
 actions of the President is claiming that by the removal of the President the cause of this
 polarisation will be also be removed, thus denying its essentially class-based nature.
 Why does the opposition refuse to recognise the class divisions of Venezuelan society?
 First, historically speaking Venezuelan politics lacked a class focus as politics was
 dominated by the elite/middle-class sectors with little autonomous organisation of the
 popular classes, a tendency further instituted during the Punto Fijo period. The main
 parties during that period were multi-class, catch-all parties, and newer class-based
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 parties such as MAS and LCR veered more to the centre as they became established.
 MAS, for example, participated in the Caldera government (1993-1998) responsible for
 many pro-market reforms with negative impacts on the working and popular classes.
 The acceptance of a class division of Venezuelan society would therefore in itself be
 divisive and against the consensual, essentially centrist Venezuelan concepts of liberal
 democracy, 'the ideological trap of the dominant class' in Carrera Damas' (1980: 86)
 words.
 Second, the opposition itself is heterogeneous and does not share a unitary ideological
 vision. Many opposition parties are class based, such as LCR, MAS, and Bandera Roja,
 having developed amongst the working and popular sectors and professing a leftist or
 centre-left ideology. Other sectors, such as AD and Copei and Primero Justicia, are
 more to the centre-right of the political spectrum and come from a multi-class
 background. Most of these sectors support, explicitly at least, a democratic solution to
 the crisis, while many other sectors, such as Fedec?maras, on the right, have supported
 democratic and military solutions, and some sectors on the far right would only
 support a military solution to the crisis.12 Other sectors, such as Arias' Union move
 ment, for example, and many NGOs in 'civil society', urge an exclusively democratic
 solution to the 'problem' of Ch?vez. Yet as we have seen most of these sectors were
 involved in the planning of the coup, or gave it at the very least tacit support. Various
 documents released by the opposition umbrella organisation, Coordinadora Democr?
 tica, for example, propose a democratic solution but do not totally reject the use of a
 coup as the mechanism to achieve a new government.13 The coup failed partially as a
 result of the abandonment of democracy by the Carmona government thus leading to
 the withdrawal of important sectors, such as the CTV and many of the political parties.
 However, these sectors were in principle in support of the coup. In other words,
 rejection of Ch?vez transcends ideological differences within the opposition, and the
 repeated attempts to overthrow him have provided it with a common project.
 Furthermore, while some sectors of the opposition may be class-based parties, these
 have supported Coordinadora Democr?tica documents which seek market-based solu
 tions to Venezuela's economic problems, within a liberal democratic and a pro-US/
 European international context. While the opposition's official discourse concentrates
 on abstract concepts of freedom and democracy, there is a tacit assumption that the
 liberal democratic structure will be 'restored' within a market-led economic frame
 work, in effect a class discourse.14 The influence of sectors of the left, however, can be
 found in the repeated prominence given to the 'struggle against poverty' found in these
 documents. Nevertheless, despite a tacit consensus in the opposition to institute market
 reforms, there is a lack of agreement as to the exact extent of these reforms, due to the
 heterogeneous nature of the coalition. Therefore, in these documents, little precise
 detail is found on how economic reform will be effected. Furthermore, from an
 opposition point of view, it is dangerous to make policies on market-oriented,
 12 http://www.fuerzasolidaria.com/ or http://www.militaresdemocraticos.com/
 13 Coordinadora Democr?tica (2002).
 14 http://www.coordinadora-democratica.com/quienessomos.asp for members of
 Coordinadora Democr?tica; Coordinadora Democr?tica (2002).
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 neoliberal reform explicit, because of the historical difficulties of these being accepted
 by the Venezuelan people, particularly the popular classes, as indicated above. Class
 analysis and acceptance of class divisions would necessitate a discussion on neoliber
 alism and thus place all opposition parties, but particularly left and centre-left parties,
 in a difficult situation with regard to their attitudes to such reforms.
 Finally, the opposition denial of the class division of Venezuelan society may also be
 a way to advance the notion of their own popular legitimacy as the true representatives
 of all the Venezuelan people, thus taking legitimacy away from the Chavez govern
 ment. Yet as we have seen in Rey's (2002) discussion on the coup above, opposition
 claims to popular representation are extremely weak. Only Chavez can truly claim to
 represent all the Venezuelan people as only he has been legitimately elected by the
 'sovereign' people of Venezuela in free and fair elections.
 Opposition strategies used so far have been radical: intensive media campaigns, a
 coup, an indefinite general production stoppage, sustained campaigns of popular
 mobilisation and repeated appeals to the military to intervene (Anonymous, 2002),
 all elements pointing to an abandonment of dialogue in favour of outright insurrection.
 Yet, the use of these strategies to force a non-democratic solution to the crisis are
 indicative of the unwillingness of most opposition sectors to accept the class nature of
 Venezuelan society and the legitimacy of the Chavez government. It is much more
 convenient to take Chavez as the cause of division in the country, rather than an
 expression of it. It could also be said that opposition strategies are equally as polarising
 and ideologically driven as any of the activities of the Chavez government. Both sides
 need to accept the legitimacy of the adversary: the government of the extensive and
 widespread popular support for the opposition, albeit concentrated in the middle- and
 upper-class sectors, the opposition of the extensive and fervent support for Chavez
 amongst the popular classes, and the legitimacy of Chavez as a valid interlocutor for
 those classes, and his government as the legitimate government of Venezuela. It is
 unlikely that this will happen, however, in the current polarised climate, where politics
 has become a hegemonic struggle. The consequences, however, of the opposition
 refusing to acknowledge the class-based nature of the current polarisation of Venezue
 lan society may simply have the effect of further deepening that polarisation.
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